For years, the defence industry has pursued a seemingly simple objective: to shoot down any aerial threat that appears on the radar. The problem is that recent conflicts have shown that it is no longer enough simply to intercept the target. It must also be done at a reasonable cost.
The proliferation of low-cost drones has changed the game. Systems such as the Iranian Shahed-136 (used extensively by Russia in Ukraine) have shown that a relatively simple threat can force the deployment of far more expensive defensive capabilities. When a drone costs a fraction of the price of the interceptor used to neutralise it, the economic sustainability of defence becomes just as important as the interception capability itself.
Consequently, the current major trend in the field of Counter-UAS (C-UAS) is not to develop more sophisticated interceptors, but to develop interceptors that are sufficiently effective and exceptionally cheap.
The real challenge: getting it right
Before cutting costs, we need to solve a much more complex problem: achieving the target.
Intercepting a small, slow drone with a low radar signature might seem easier than intercepting a supersonic missile. In practice, however, the opposite is often the case. Modern drones have low signatures, can fly at low altitude and perform unpredictable manoeuvres.
Consequently, much of today’s innovation is focused on guidance, navigation and control (GNC) systems. Electro-optical sensors, on-board artificial intelligence and advanced terminal guidance algorithms are enabling increasingly smaller interceptors to strike their target directly or fly close enough to ensure its neutralisation.
And this is where the real revolution begins.
When a war leader is no longer needed
Traditionally, anti-aircraft missiles are fitted with a fragmentation warhead to compensate for guidance errors. A direct hit was not necessary; it was enough for the missile to explode close enough.
But if the guidance system is capable of ensuring a direct hit on a kamikaze drone carrying its own explosive, many of those solutions are no longer essential.
The most striking example is probably the Russian Yolka. Its philosophy is radically simple: to use a lightweight interceptor capable of reaching the target drone directly and detonating its explosive payload on impact. If the system can hit its target, why carry unnecessary weight?
Removing the warhead reduces weight, complexity, logistics and cost. It is a decision that would have seemed risky a few years ago, but which makes perfect sense once guidance accuracy reaches a certain level.
In fact, Yolka reflects a much broader trend that can already be seen in numerous international programmes: once the guidance issue has been resolved, every gram and every euro becomes a candidate for elimination.
A global trend
Russia and Ukraine are experimenting with FPV drone-based interceptors, autonomous pursuit systems and direct-impact solutions, which have been developed at great speed in response to the operational requirements of the conflict.
The United States is exploring low-cost interceptors, hunter drones and new air defence architectures capable of automatically selecting the most efficient response to each threat.
In Europe, companies such as Airbus, MBDA, Rheinmetall, Saab, Leonardo and Thales are working on different approaches to tackle the same problem: how to neutralise threats costing just a few thousand euros without resorting to interceptors that cost one or several orders of magnitude more.
The solutions vary, but the direction is the same. The future of C-UAS appears to be moving towards interceptors that are lighter, simpler and much cheaper than traditional ground-to-air systems.
Much more than just a business opportunity
Investment in C-UAS technologies is often justified by the huge growth expected in this market over the next decade. And there is undoubtedly a significant industrial opportunity.
However, the main motivation should be something else.
Low-cost drones have shown that they can pose a strategic threat. They are relatively easy to produce, difficult to detect and effective enough to overwhelm conventional defences. There is no indication that this trend is set to reverse.
For this reason, developing our own capabilities in C-UAS systems is not merely a matter of industrial competitiveness. It is a matter of technological sovereignty.
Because when the time comes to protect our own critical infrastructure, deployed forces or even our national territory, relying exclusively on systems developed by third parties can become a vulnerability in itself. And in defence, vulnerabilities rarely give any warning before they emerge.
